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This rapprochement of development projects, centers of 
commerce and government offices is particularly convenient 
for – or perhaps related to – the ‘development industry’ in 
Tambacounda. The Regional Council of Tambacounda, a 
product of 1996 decentralisation reforms in Senegal, was 
also located on that side of the railway. This location suited 
perfectly the special role assigned to the Regional Council, 
as the new ‘intermediary of development.’ State officials, 
scholars and donors alike celebrated the 1996 reforms and its 
re-institution of elected regional councils as a step towards the 
deepening of ‘democratic’ decentralisation in Senegal (Diouf 
1998). Regional councils, while sub-national, are hardly 
local.1 Nonetheless, the 1996 reforms quickly subsumed 
them under the category of ‘local authority,’ which putatively 
conferred on them both legitimacy and representativeness 
(Snook et al. 2013).
In October of 2004, the United States Agency for International 
Development’s (USAID’s) Agriculture-Natural Resource 
Management Program initiated a public meeting at the Regional 
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INTRODUCTION
Since its rise as a hub of trade and a transit point for 
peanuts at the beginning of the twentieth century, the city 
of Tambacounda, capital of the Tambacounda Region, has 
been divided by the railroad. On one side there are buildings 
occupied by development projects, the regional court and 
governmental offices. Townspeople live on the other side. 
The weekly market and development projects are set on 
the side where the administrative affairs are conducted. 
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Council to discuss the implementation of decentralisation 
reforms in the field of natural resource management. The 
participants included high-level representatives from the 
Forestry, National Parks and Agricultural Departments, and 
from ‘community-based’ forestry projects in Tambacounda. 
The USAID program, which went by its adopted ‘local’ 
name, Wula Nafaa (‘the benefit of the forest’)2 was launched 
in Tambacounda in 2003. Until then, the Sustainable and 
Participatory Energy Management Project (PROGEDE by its 
French acronym), funded by the World Bank, was the dominant 
actor in decentralised natural resource management in Senegal 
via its ‘community-based’ initiatives. Wula Nafaa chose to hold 
the meeting under the aegis of the regional council. 
The topic of the meeting, decentralisation of natural 
resource management, concerned all elected authorities in 
Tambacounda. Thus, one would have expected a high level of 
attendance from thirty-five base-level elected councils (the rural 
community councils or local governments) that represented the 
inhabitants of the region. Yet, only the presidents of two elected 
rural community councils were present. None of them spoke 
during the debate, the terms of which, as I will explain, were 
set by Wula Nafaa, PROGEDE and the Forestry Department. 
This low attendance contradicted the regional council’s role as 
a deliberative democratic forum (MSI-USAID 2007), where 
the base-level rural councils could express their interests, 
needs and demands. Only at the very end of the meeting, the 
President of the Regional Association of Rural Community 
Councils took the floor to make the following comment on 
behalf of the rural community councils. He said:
 The management of the environment is a power transferred 
to rural communities. However, what the State gives 
with its right hand, it takes back with its left hand. The 
management of natural resources generates financial 
resources. How will the state allow these resources to be 
devolved to local populations? Wula Nafaa program is a 
very good initiative for this.
The President conveyed a general sense of disappointment 
about decentralisation prevalent among the rural councils. The 
new decentralisation reforms and Forestry laws had transferred 
a number of powers to the elected councils concerning the 
conservation and management of forests in terroir zones3 
(RdS 1996a; RdS 1996b). These powers focused primarily 
on the commercial exploitation of forests and production of 
forest-based commodities (charcoal, timber, non-timber forest 
products)4 (RdS 1998). They allowed the rural councils to plan 
for and authorise commercial tree cutting and to claim a share 
from commercial forest revenues. However, the President’s 
comment indicated that despite decentralisation, the elected 
councils were unable to exercise these powers, which, he 
complained, were taken away by other means. His comment 
was primarily directed to centralised conservation institutions 
(National Parks and Forestry Departments), whose image as 
coercive extensions of the ‘state’ had been cemented through 
exclusionary conservation practices (Ece 2009, 2012). The 
President implied that these institutions were able to take 
the power to manage forests on terroir zones back from 
the hands of the rural councils. At the same time, he also 
suggested that decentralisation presented a ‘choice’ for the 
rural councils. This choice came down to choosing among 
different community-based projects and different options they 
offered for the devolution of financial resources derived from 
the commercial exploitation of terroir forests. Thus, they opted 
for Wula Nafaa. 
As the President pointed out and as it will later be elaborated, 
contrary to donor and state discourses, the transfer of powers 
in natural resource governance did not grant more ‘freedom’ 
to rural councils in the management of forests under their 
jurisdiction. However, I argue that decentralisation also 
constrained and framed these powers (and their autonomy) 
in ways that would facilitate the commodification of terroir 
forests and enable their privatisation through different 
‘community-based’ forestry projects. In this context, the 
regional councils had an important role to play.  Reinstituted 
as ‘local authorities’ by 1996 decentralisation reforms,5 
they were also given the mandate to act as ‘intermediaries 
of development’ to facilitate ‘cooperation’ among various 
community-based projects, base-level rural councils and the 
state institutions (RdS 1996a).  This article argues that the 
mediating role assigned to regional councils by decentralisation 
reforms contributed to: (i) their instrumentalisation for 
commodification of forests and increased forest exploitation, 
and (ii) transformation of their role into the ‘filtering’ of 
development demands from base-level rural communities, 
running counter to and undermining their ability to represent 
the ‘local’ needs and aspirations. Further, their capacity 
to serve as a forum for rural community councils to voice 
their needs and aspirations, and hold the state conservation 
institutions (e.g. the Forestry Department) accountable was 
also compromised. Although in theory, regional councils 
were expected to offer a deliberative democratic space for 
rural councils, the donor-funded community-based forestry 
projects and the state conservation and forestry institutions 
dominated and set the terms of debates. These actors claimed 
not only to ‘represent’ local interests, but also, presented their 
priorities – the commodification and privatisation of terroir 
forests – as the most preferable, if not the only available choices 
for the rural community councils. 
The community-based forestry and conservation 
projects proliferated in Tambacounda following the 1996 
decentralisation reforms. Throughout Africa, this was the 
time when community-based natural resource management 
became an established environmental policy goal with the 
context of ongoing decentralisation reforms (Murombedzi 
1999; Shivji 2002). The 1990s’ wave of decentralisations 
were a key component of the process of ‘reregulation’ and 
‘roll out’ of the state, infusing neoliberal forms of governance 
within public institutions as well as local governments 
(Harrison 2005; McCarthy 2005; Ayers 2006).  The critical 
scholarship on conservation sought to understand how these 
processes of neoliberalisation, which took varying forms 
depending on different social, political and institutional 
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contexts, furthered the commodification and privatisation 
of nature (West 2006; Igoe and Brockington 2007; Castree 
2008; Büscher and Dressler 2012). At the same time, these 
debates have also underlined the controversial role that the 
community-based forestry and conservation projects played 
in furthering the neoliberalisation of nature (McCarthy 2005; 
Dressler et al. 2010; Büscher and Dressler 2012). As it is 
the case in Senegal, elsewhere in the developing world, the 
community-based projects funded by donors and implemented 
by different NGOs, contributed to the integration of peoples 
and resources into commodity-based systems of production 
– including eco-tourism and the forest-based commodity 
chains (Walley 2004; West 2004; Brosius et al. 2005; Blaikie 
2006). These practices were also accompanied by discourses 
promoting market-based relations, by defining local forest 
users (‘communities’) as rational economic decision-makers, 
‘free’ to enter into contractual relationships and, by seeking 
their ‘consent’ through financial benefits (McCarthy 2005; 
Doane 2014; Peterson and Isenhour 2014). Still, how elected 
local governments’ control and authority over public resources 
had been transformed through formal decentralisations and, 
how community-based forestry projects were inserted in 
this landscape of power relations, enabling market-based 
governance and privatisation of these resources, had not been 
sufficiently studied.
In this regard, critical analyses of natural resource 
decentralisations offer important insights about the assumed 
association between the devolution of state powers to local 
authorities and democratisation (Agrawal & Ribot 1999; 
Ribot 2003, Ribot 2004; Larson & Ribot 2005). Re-thinking 
concepts like ‘accountability’ and ‘responsiveness’ – central 
in donor policy discourses – this work emphasises that 
without significant decision-making powers, financial 
resources and technical means, elected authorities cannot 
respond to the demands and needs of their constituents; hence, 
their ability to represent local interests would be undermined. 
This is the case, when decentralisations transfer powers to 
elected authorities but limit those powers with state legislative 
or administrative oversight. Also, if the powers to manage 
natural resources are held by institutions other than elected 
representatives, these former would not be downwardly 
accountable to people affected by their actions.6 This later 
situation would also account for the privatisation of public 
powers (Ribot and Agrawal 1999; Ribot and Chatree 2008). 
This is the case, when the means and powers to manage 
public forests are transferred to new institutions recognised 
and empowered by donor-funded projects, which work 
in parallel to elected authorities (Ribot 2013). Thus, the 
creation and authorisation of local institutions accountable 
to and recognised as representative of private interests by 
community-based projects amounts to the privatisation 
resource governance. 
This article is organised in three sections. The first 
examines the legal and administrative aspects of 1996 
decentralisation reforms. I show that the mechanisms of 
displaced oversight limiting the autonomy of elected councils 
provide also an ‘enabling environment’ for new market-based 
forms of development cooperation. I also draw attention 
to the role of cooperation agreements and private-public 
partnerships introduced by decentralisation, including the 
forest management plans. While they impose limitations 
on how forests should be commercially exploited on terroir 
zones, these plans are also treated as de facto local cooperation 
agreements between community-based projects and rural 
community councils.
The second section focuses on community forests and 
biodiversity reserves established by PROGEDE and Wula 
Nafaa. Analysis of these two projects shows that while 
they initially differed in their relationship with the Forestry 
Department, they share a similar goal: the commodification 
of forests under the jurisdiction of the rural councils and 
privatisation of their governance through commercial peasant 
organisations. Their strategies and methods for establishing 
different kinds of protected areas at the periphery of the 
Niokolo-Koba National Park were also similar. Both projects 
relied on local groups and committees, accountable to them for 
the implementation of forest management plans, and bypassed 
elected rural councils in the process.
The third section discusses regional councils and how 
their role as intermediaries of development helped their 
instrumentalisation to further the neoliberal vision of the 
Forestry Department and environmental projects. I also argue 
that through a public-private development agency, inserted 
into their midst, regional councils became sites for negotiating 
contractual agreements, including forest management plans. 
Finally, I return to the meeting held in Tambacounda’s 
Regional Council and look at the discourses and positions 
of the actors represented in this meeting. I suggest that, far 
from offering a ‘participatory and deliberative’ forum, this 
meeting constituted a re-enactment of unequal authority 
relations that exists ‘outside’ of the meeting room, and it was 
used to establish the market-based rationality as a dominant 
discursive framework. 
This article is based on 12 months of field research carried 
out in Tambacounda, Senegal between 2004 and 2005. A 
number of different social science methods were used to 
collect qualitative data. For the analysis of decentralisation 
reforms, forestry and conservation policies, I consulted 
governmental documents, legal and administrative texts and 
interviewed academics from the University of Cheikh Anta 
Diop’s Centre de Recherches, d’Etudes et de Documentations 
sur les Institutions et les Legislations (CREDILA). For the 
analysis of and the community-based forestry projects in 
Tambacounda, I consulted project documents and the archives 
of Forestry and National Park Services. In addition, I carried 
out over 60 semi-structured and in-depth interviews and 
participant observation involving the staff and directors of 
Forestry and National Parks Departments, the conservation and 
development projects in areas surrounding the Niokolo-Koba 
National Park, the Regional ARD Secretariat, rural community 
council of Dialakoto, and villages evicted from the National 
Park.
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THE NEW DECENTRALISATION: A REFORM OF 
FREEDOM, PROXIMITY AND CONTRACTUAL 
AGREEMENT 
The year 1996 has often been described as the year marking the 
‘great decentralisation movement’ in Senegal7 (Toure 2012). 
This was a culmination of a long process of ‘disengagement of 
the state’ initiated through Structural Adjustment Programmes 
under Abou Diouf, who summarised them with his well-known 
slogan: “less State, better State” (moins d’Etat, mieux d’Etat) 
(Blundo 1998; Ka and Van de Walle 1994; van de Walle 
2003). At the beginning of the 1990s, the economic failure of 
the structural adjustment, the popular unrest that it generated 
(Mbodj 1992; Thioub et al. 1995; Sy 1998; O’Bannon 2006) 
and, the passage to multiparty system helped to propel 
decentralisation reforms up in the government’s political 
agenda (Dickovick 2005).
The official discourse supporting the reform claimed that 
elected local governments had reached ‘maturity’ (majeures) 
and it was time to grant them more ‘autonomy’ and ‘freedom’ 
by lifting the administrative oversight over their decisions (RdS 
1996a). The Local Government Law emphasised ‘freedom’ and 
‘proximity’ as the guiding concepts of the reform (ibid, 1996a). 
‘Proximity,’ aimed at bringing the decision making ‘closer’ to 
local level. This term evoked both political decentralisation, 
involving the transfer of authority to elected councils, and 
the process of de-concentration.8 The basis of the claims of 
granting more autonomy to local authorities lay in the removal 
of the pre-approval check of the Ministry of Interior over the 
elected councils’ decisions (Fall 2004). The Local Government 
laws adopted in 1996, replaced this type of centralised 
administrative oversight with a posteriori and ‘closer’ legality 
check in the hands of de-concentrated territorial administrators 
(governors, prefects, and sub-prefects) (RdS 1996a). This 
tension between de-concentration and political decentralisation 
became the center of debates in Senegal. The reform’s 
democratic claims through the idioms of ‘freedom’ and 
‘autonomy’ led some scholars to hastily qualify it as a sign of 
the deepening of political decentralisation. But others worried 
that the proposed changes would amount to the reinstitution 
oversight in new guises, as legality checks of de-concentrated 
territorial administrators ( Diouf 1998; Sy 1998; Cisse 2004; 
Fall 2004; Dickovick 2005; Toure 2012). 
The second most debated aspect of the 1996 reforms, 
was the re-organisation of regions as new ‘local’ authorities 
(collectivités locales)9 (RdS 1996a). The constitution of elected 
regional councils, presumably on equal footing as base-level 
rural community councils, was an important justification of 
‘democratic’ claims of the reform. The regional councils were 
expected to be democratic, deliberative institutions, like the 
rural councils. Yet, unlike rural councils, they were given a 
strategic task of mediating and coordinating development 
efforts. For this purpose, ‘semi-autonomous’ Agencies for 
Regional Development (ARDs) were created to provide 
‘free technical assistance’ to rural councils in development 
and environmental planning. This was related to a less 
well-explored, yet key element of the 1996 decentralisations: 
initiating a (controlled) transformation of administrative 
relations linking centralised state institutions to local elected 
authorities, through a model of ‘cooperation agreements.’ 
The 1996 Local Government Law allowed cooperation 
agreements among the elected councils (at the scale of 
region, urban commune and rural community), and between 
elected councils and de-concentrated state institutions (e.g. 
Forestry Department).10 The purpose of these agreements 
was to promote ‘common interests’ of local collectivities 
in economic, social and cultural development, education, 
and environmental management. The regions, communes 
and rural communities were encouraged to put in place a 
deliberative framework for cooperation agreements (cadre 
de concertation)11. However, what this framework could or 
should be was left open to interpretation,12 opening the space 
for business-like contractual relationships (Granier 2006). An 
example of this is the forest management plans allowing the 
exploitation of terroir forests. The forest management plans 
are often interpreted by donors, and the ‘community’ based 
forestry and conservation projects, as a form of cooperation 
agreement in natural resource management ( Seegers 2005; 
Granier 2006). 
Decentralisation laws did not prevent the rural councils 
from drafting their own management plans. However, the 
laws pointed rural councils towards ‘competent’13 technical 
services (the regional Forestry Department) for assistance 
(RdS 1998)14. This provided the Forestry Department an 
opportunity to claim back their authority by setting the rules 
on forest management plans, assuming or using the pretext that 
rural councils lack ‘technical capacity’ to do so. These plans 
became political instruments for Forestry Department and 
sub-prefects to exercise administrative and technical oversight 
over elected councils. For this reason, forest management plans 
are often considered as an important limitation to the powers 
devolved to rural councils. While this is certainly the case, 
these are also strategic tools for international environmental 
projects. While international organisations are not allowed to 
be ‘official’ parties for cooperation agreements, in practice, all 
forest management plans are drafted through the assistance of 
international development organisations, financial institutions 
and externally funded projects (Potteete & Ribot 2011). Hence, 
they are also used by forestry-projects to claim ‘technical’ 
expertise and justify their influence and control of commercial 
production in terroir forests (Faye 2014).
PRIVATISATION OF RESOURCE GOVERNANCE 
THROUGH COMMUNITY FORESTS AND 
BIODIVERSITY RESERVES 
Tambacounda is one of the most forested regions of Senegal. 
It produces majority of charcoal for urban areas and has the 
largest number of protected areas – including the Niokolo-
Koba National Park (RdS 2005). Even though the region had 
been the target of conservation interventions since the French 
colonial period, the recent wave of commodification of its 
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forests owes largely to the entry of ‘community-based’ forestry 
projects after the 1996 decentralisation reforms.
PROGEDE, whose main funding source is the World Bank, 
started its activities in Tambacounda in 1997, a year after 
the adoption of decentralisation laws (GEF 2004). Its main 
goal was to provision charcoal to urban areas’ charcoal trade 
liberalisation and to increase the ‘sustainable’ production of 
charcoal while conserving biodiversity in rural areas (WB 
2005, p.15). However, rather than trying to eliminate the 
charcoal quota system15 (Ribot 2006, 2009), PROGEDE 
directed its efforts towards providing ‘institutional’ assistance 
to transform the Forestry Department, seen as an inefficient 
‘paramilitary law enforcer agency,’ into an efficient ‘service 
provider’ armed with technical tools of scientific forestry 
(WB 2005, p. 5, 11). PROGEDE placed its offices within the 
Forestry Department and employed appointed foresters  (Faye 
2006, Bandiaky 2008). 
Unlike PROGEDE, USAID-supported Wula Nafaa was 
not administered through the Forestry Department, but by 
a US-based consultancy firm (IRG) - subcontracted by the 
USAID.16 Wula Nafaa started its activities in Tambacounda in 
2003 and adopted a different approach to sustainable’ charcoal 
production, which was only one of the ‘potentially marketable’ 
forest-based commodities that the project targeted on village 
terroirs (Weidemann Associates 2006).17
Despite these important differences, PROGEDE and Wula 
Nafaa converged on their economic rationality justifying 
their interventions. PROGEDE adopted a logic and discourse 
borrowed from neo-classical economics: liberalising the 
charcoal trade would maximise producer’s revenues, which 
then would provide ‘right incentives’ for the producers for 
exploiting the forests in more sustainable way (WB 2005, 
p.13). Like PROGEDE, Wula Nafaa promoted the merger 
of ‘economic interest’ with conservation. It argued that 
revenues from forest-based commodities would stimulate 
better resource management and conservation. Another 
important commonality was that both projects supported 
local producer groups organised as Economic Interest Groups 
(GIE), as locomotives for local entrepreneurial spirit and 
development (USAID-Senegal 2013; WB 2005; Weidemann 
Associates 2006). The GIEs are for-profit commercial peasant 
organisations that emerged after the dissolution of state-owned 
agricultural cooperatives18 (Blundo 1994; Bierschenk et al. 
2000). As I will explain next, by supporting existing GIEs or 
setting up local environmental committees that they treated as 
GIEs, both projects contributed to privatisation of governance 
of terroir forests.
To supply urban areas with charcoal while preserving the 
biodiversity, PROGEDE planned to establish a series of 
‘community’ forests and biodiversity reserves around the 
Niokolo-Koba National Park (PROGEDE 2008). Although 
the National Park already had a buffer zone,19 PROGEDE’s 
community reserves were geared to extend the concept of a 
‘buffer zone,’ providing a supplemental layer of protection 
for the ‘core’ protected area (PROGEDE 2009). The Malidino 
reserve, situated in the rural community of Dialakoto, next to the 
Niokolo-Koba National Park, illustrates well the PROGEDE’s 
concept of ‘participation’. The ‘community’ reserve included a 
section of the gazetted Diambour forest and part of terroir areas. 
The majority (98%) of the villagers in the center-village next to 
the reserve had land inside the proposed reserve area and was 
against the land appropriation for biodiversity conservation 
(Bandiaky 2008). A Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Forestry Department and the rural council20 was required 
for the establishment of the reserve (Seegers 2005). However, 
PROGEDE did not engage with the rural council members 
to discuss this memorandum. Instead, it proceeded with the 
drafting of a reserve management plan and by-laws and started 
to set up local management committees (Bandiaky 2008, p.115, 
116). The forest management plan drafted under the watchful 
eye of PROGEDE did not consider the objections of villagers, 
and did not foresee any compensation mechanism for those 
who would be dispossessed of their farmland (Bandiaky 2008, 
p.129-150). Neither the management plan nor the by-laws were 
submitted for deliberation and approval of the rural council, but 
only to the rural council president and the Forestry Department 
in 2002 (Bandiaky 2008, p. 150). A request for land allocation 
for the reserve was submitted to the rural council in 2003, after 
the ‘acceptance’ of the forest management plan and by-laws 
(Ece 2008). Despite ‘loud objections’ of the rural councilors21 
against it, the Forestry department’s representative and the 
sub-prefect who attended the meeting pressured the council 
to approve the decision, as the creation of the reserve was 
already a fait accompli. 
The PROGEDE followed a similar model of ‘participation’ 
in its ‘community’ forests. As  the villagers resisted giving up 
productive farmland for ‘community’ biodiversity reserves, 
they were also resistant to charcoal production (Faye 2006; 
Bandiaky 2008; Ribot 2009). The PROGEDE’s forestry agents 
promised increased revenues, used deceptive tactics, and 
managed to orient the inhabitants towards increasing charcoal 
production (Faye 2006). The presidents of the rural councils 
were pressured to sign the management plans and by-laws 
drafted by the project without consultation with the rural 
councils – as it was the case for biodiversity reserves (Ribot 
2009). The local management committees set up by PROGEDE 
did not report to the rural council, but were accountable only to 
the project and to the Forestry Department (Faye 2006, 2014). 
In contrast to PROGEDE, Wula Nafaa aimed to work directly 
with local producers and rural communities to promote market-
based production and sale of forest-based and agricultural 
products. The project was also involved in the preparation 
of management plans and by-laws for charcoal producing 
community forests. While there is no detailed information on 
how these plans and by-laws were adopted, the project claimed 
that it consulted with the rural councils, placed management 
committees under the oversight of rural councils, and directed 
the village chiefs to obtain rural council’s approval (USDA 
2004; Weidemann Associates 2006; Faye 2014). However, 
this does not necessarily make Wula Nafaa an inherently more 
‘democratic’ project. Wula Nafaa had been supporting some 
of the village management committees that were already set 
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up by the Forestry Department (Faye 2014). Like PROGEDE, 
the project approached the management plans as ‘technical 
prescriptions,’ geared to increase charcoal production, despite 
local resistance against it (Faye, 2014). 
Another important commonality between the two projects 
was their approach towards the environmental committees 
that they helped to create as commercial GIEs, responsible for 
carrying out the project goals. The PROGEDE treated these 
committees as de facto GIEs acting as contractual parties in 
charcoal sales to urban merchants (Faye 2006). Wula Nafaa 
seemed to present a ‘better option’ compared to PROGEDE, 
since foresters did not manage it and it offered a more varied 
range of outlets and merchants for the sale of forest-based 
products. Yet, similar to PROGEDE, it invested great efforts to 
fuel forest-based commodity production (including charcoal) 
through GIEs as private for-profit organisations. Thus, what 
Wula Nafaa offered was merely a variation in the terms of 
privatisation in charcoal production. 
In the next section, I return to the regional council’s meeting 
held in 2004 in Tambacounda to illustrate two points. First, 
regional councils are also subject to similar pressures as 
the rural councils by the Forestry Department. Second, the 
relations that I described so far between the projects and the 
elected councils were also played out in the regional council’s 
meeting. 
PERFORMING DEMOCRACY: REGIONAL 
COUNCIL AS THE MEDIATOR OF DEVELOPMENT 
COOPERATION
The 1996 Local Government Code did not establish a 
hierarchical distinction between the local collectivities 
(rural communities, communes and regions) and forbade 
administrative oversight22 of one council over another. 
The Regional Council’s President was elected among the 
presidents of the rural community councils  (see Faye in this 
issue). However, in its role of ‘promoting’ and ‘coordinating’ 
development-related investments and actions, the regional 
council had the ability to constrain and shape rural community 
council’s decisions (Ly & Diedhiou 1997; Toure 2012).23 To 
carry out this important function of coordination and planning, 
a special agency was created in the midst of the regional 
council: the Agency for Regional Development (ARD).
ARDs are mandated to provide ‘free technical assistance’ to 
rural councils in all activities related to development, including 
the follow up on the agreements passed with international 
donors.24 Donors – which also include the French elected 
regional assemblies –  consider them as important interlocutors 
and facilitators of ‘private-public’ partnerships and provide 
them funding under ‘capacity building’ (Keshishian et al. 
2010).25 However, state administrators have an important 
influence over the technical commission of ARDs, composed 
of appointed regional representatives of different state 
departments, including the regional director of the Forestry 
Department.26 This makes the ARDs ‘hybrid’ institutions 
(Ndiaye 2013), where both donors and state departments’ 
demands and interests are negotiated. In fact, in Tambacounda, 
the ‘local agreements’ about charcoal producing community 
forests signed between the Forestry Department, sub-prefects 
and the rural council presidents were hosted by the ARD.
As shown earlier, the forest management plans financed 
and carried out by community-based projects and the Forestry 
Department were drafted and implemented without taking 
into account the demands of rural councils and despite their 
opposition. This was an indicator that the regional council, 
especially through ARDs, was led to prioritise the demands and 
expectations of the donors and the Forestry Department over 
those of the rural councils.  The regional councils were not able 
to respond to such demands, and hold the Forestry Department 
accountable. In fact, they were used to ‘filter’ development 
demands from below. This was also the case for the distribution 
of charcoal quotas in Tambacounda. Even though the regional 
council had the authority to distribute the charcoal quotas,27 
it was unable to exercise this authority. When the regional 
council called a meeting to deliberate on regional charcoal 
quota allocations in 2004, despite the request of some rural 
councils to be consulted on the matter, the Forestry Department 
used the meeting to simply announce pre-set charcoal quotas 
(Ribot 2009). This incident, which took place the same year 
as the meeting that I analyse next, illuminated how regional 
councils can be sites for the Forestry Department to continue 
to coerce and silence the demands of rural councils.
The Meeting of the Regional Council
The Regional Council’s meeting, held in October of 2004 
under the aegis of Wula Nafaa, attracted both the attention 
and discontent of the Forestry Department and PROGEDE. 
Although the meeting was convened to discuss decentralisation 
of natural resource management, its main purpose was to 
introduce Wula Nafaa. The time allocated to Wula Nafaa’s 
presentation was considerably longer than the time reserved 
for the comments of other participants. The second part of 
the meeting, much shorter than the first, was reserved for the 
comments of other participants. As indicated earlier on, during 
the meeting the representatives of the rural councils remained 
largely silent. This lack of engagement and absenteeism28 can 
be viewed as form of sanction. However, another important 
reason why rural councils refuse to engage in such meetings 
is that the terms and results of the debates are perceived as 
being pre-determined.  It has been shown that in ‘participatory’ 
meetings like the one held at the Regional Council, the 
selection of topics or themes and, the framing of key issues 
can be important strategies through which powerful actors can 
further their points of view and exclude alternative options 
(Peterson et al.  2010).  Hence, these meetings constitute 
another instance of enactment of unequal power relations that 
exists among the ‘participants’ within the wider social context.
At the beginning of the meeting, the Vice- President of 
the regional council made an opening statement, where he 
presented the Wula Nafaa as a “program of the Government 
of Senegal supported by the United States of America to 
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fight poverty and development in Senegal.” As the ‘host,’ he 
reminded the assembly that the Senegalese government had 
two important goals: decentralisation and privatisation. He 
continued:
 Today, nature is a wealth (richesse) that populations are 
claiming. These claims are based on common functions 
of any human society: to carry out agricultural production 
and cultural reproduction. If these functions are not carried 
out sustainably, we will face environmental problems. This 
is why Wula Nafaa is an important development project.
The Vice-President’s presentation emphasised that the 
‘legitimacy’ of Wula Nafaa for the government, and for 
Regional Council derived from its role in decentralisation 
and privatisation. By stressing the market value (wealth), 
the use-value (agriculture) and the cultural value (cultural 
reproduction) of nature, the Vice-President claimed also to 
represent the rural people and their point of view. Yet, his 
emphasis on subsistence and cultural valuing of nature would 
become submerged under the dominance of the discourses that 
single-handedly focused on market value.
Next, the Director of the Wula Nafaa program in Dakar 
made sure that he stressed one important issue: the project 
was focusing on ‘sustainable use’ and ‘valorisation’ of natural 
resources in terroir areas. This strategically underlined the 
rural councils’ authority over terroir forests. Following this, 
the Regional Director explained the project’s view of nature 
as follows: “…. in poor countries, within the total capital 
available to the country, the natural capital has a much larger 
share. This means that it is best to focus on natural capital to 
eradicate poverty….” Nature, for him, was the most marketable 
commodity of the poor countries. It was the commodification 
and marketing of nature that would help countries like Senegal 
to create ‘wealth’ and help eradicate poverty. 
Wula Nafaa’s economist elaborated this idea by arguing 
that population increase would lead to an increase in demand 
for natural resources, more economic ‘dynamism’ and more 
‘market opportunities.’ He explained Wula Nafaa’s approach 
to nature as capital. “This meant that like any economic good, 
nature could bring economic benefits over the long run,” and 
hence, there was a need “to look at natural capital to overcome 
poverty.” By turning the Malthusian population argument on 
its head, the economist argued that when population increases, 
so would the profit derived from natural resources. Once 
nature had become a commodity everywhere, its ‘economic 
benefits’ would, ‘in the long run,’ trickle down to rural people. 
He elaborated on why commodification of nature mattered 
for ‘populations’ as follows: “If the management of natural 
resources doesn’t have an economic interest for people, they 
will not do it. Our purpose is to create a framework for people 
to make best decisions possible in line with their own interests 
[my emphasis].” By claiming to adopt the ‘local point of view’ 
the economist argued that to protect nature, people needed to 
have an ‘economic interest.’ This reasoning, underpinning 
also the project’s discourse in its documents (Anderson 2004), 
privileged the market value of natural resources and assumed 
that ‘local people’ were acting uniquely according to the tenets 
of neo-classical rational-choice theory, comparing economic 
costs and benefits based on market value. It also echoed 
the neoliberal discourses that dominate the current ‘green 
development’ pushed by the World Bank and international 
development institutions. It highlighted the market value 
of nature as capital, the importance of commodification of 
nature and, extrapolated the neoclassical economic rationality 
of ‘cost-benefit’ analysis to ‘local people.’ In the project’s 
perspective, the main ‘interest’ of the ‘populations’ was 
economic and the project was answering this interest by 
creating a ‘framework’ to allow people to follow their own 
economic interests and make ‘best decisions.’
Another important theme in Wula Nafaa’s presentation was 
private property. The Project Director in Dakar explained:
 “The power component of our program focuses on natural 
resources as a means to consolidate democracy and to 
reform governance. We need to clarify the rights of the local 
populations over resources.... To whom do trees belong? Who 
makes decisions about their exploitation? We need to make 
sure that the power to manage natural resources is given to 
institutions which are better placed to exercise those rights.” 
The Director argued that the project aimed at ‘consolidation 
of democracy’ by ‘clarifying the rights of the local populations 
over resources.’ He left open the question of what kinds of 
rights he was advocating for and this ambiguity relayed the 
idea that he equated property to democratic rights. He also 
emphasised that the project wanted to give the (property and 
democratic) rights to ‘right’ institutions, without specifying if 
these were elected rural councils, the GIEs or the individuals. 
The economist clarified this point further by pressing on 
the need for a new land tenure reform – which was indeed 
proposed in 1996: 
 The assumption that nature belongs to the State is not valid 
any more... We need to make sure that the managers of the 
natural resources have secure access to natural resources 
and that they have the knowledge of this access. By this 
I mean, we need a new system of land tenure, other than 
the traditional land tenure, which is not sufficient for 
development. It is necessary that populations have the 
feeling that by investing in natural resources that they will 
derive benefit from it.
The economist stressed that neither the current land laws 
that considered the ‘State’ as the owner of natural resources, 
nor the ‘traditional’ land tenure was fit for ‘secure access’ to 
resources. Underlying this reasoning was the idea that neither 
state ownership nor ‘traditional’ property regimes could propel 
enough development. Development could be achieved only if 
‘populations’ as ‘managers’ of natural resources held property 
rights. 
These presentations set the terms of the debate as 
commodification and privatisation of natural resources and 
their governance. The responses to these presentations were also 
framed to discuss these issues and showed the positions of the 
actors present in the meeting vis-à-vis the project and its goals. 
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Responses to Wula Nafaa
At the time when this meeting was convened, considerable 
tensions existed between the Forestry Department and Wula 
Nafaa over community forests (USDA 2004).29 More than any 
other activity, Wula Nafaa’s intention to engage in charcoal 
production was not welcomed by PROGEDE, nor by Forestry 
Department, which saw it as an unwelcome intrusion into their 
‘territory.30 It was not surprising that the main objection to 
Wula Nafaa’s goals and objectives came from PROGEDE’s 
Regional Director:
 Wula Nafaa experiences are based on other countries. 
Senegal’s juridical and political context is very specific. 
Wula Nafaa works also with the populations living within 
the gazetted government forests. Gazetted Forests are 
under the responsibility of technical services. Talking to 
populations without mentioning technical services is a 
mistake.
The Director of Forestry Department in Tambacounda also 
supported PROGEDE’s view: 
 Wula Nafaa is stepping outside the terroir zones. Wula 
Nafaa works with populations living within the gazetted 
forests. It should cooperate with PROGEDE. PROGEDE 
has to be included in management plans.... The community 
Reserve of Malidino at the periphery of the National 
Park is a good example. There are other examples of 
co-management of forests that are underway…. Local 
environmental bylaws are being developed and these 
will organise the valorisation and protection of natural 
resources.
While PROGEDE insisted that Wula Nafaa should work 
with Forestry Department, the Forestry Department stressed 
that the project should work with PROGEDE, which acts as 
an extension of the Forestry Department. PROGEDE and 
Forestry Service strongly opposed Wula Nafaa’s attempts to 
work in the region unless it was integrated or agreed to work 
with them. Neither the Forestry Department nor PROGEDE 
objected to Wula Nafaa neoliberal approach or to privatisation. 
The Malidino Community Biodiversity Reserve was pointed 
as the example that Wula Nafaa should follow to stress that 
instead of recognising the ‘rural populations’ authority, the 
project should help extend the authority of Forestry Department 
and PROGEDE over terroir zones. 
The speech of the representative of the ARD focused on 
private ownership of natural resources. He said:
 If the peasant cannot sell his land, he cannot put it in 
productive use and increase its value. Similarly, if nature 
is not well managed, it will have no value. To help peasants 
generate value from land and nature, the State must help 
peasants. 
He underlined the importance of private ownership and 
economic value of nature by arguing that if the ‘peasant’ 
would be able to sell the land, he would also use land more 
productively and ‘increase its value.’ This argument echoed 
the well-known justifications of private property as collateral: 
private property rights will allow the peasants to use land to 
borrow money and to re-invest this money in agricultural 
productivity. His rationale was clearly based on the idea that 
the value of land was in its market value. In that sense, the 
ARD seemed to be in perfect agreement with the neoliberal 
rationale promoted by Wula Nafaa’s economist earlier on. Yet, 
this position differed from Wula Nafaa’s, since it supported 
the idea of privatisation ‘assisted’ by the State. The ‘State’ 
had to help the peasants to benefit from resources, by helping 
privatisation - instead of helping the peasants claiming their 
rights. 
The Vice-President of the Regional Council justified his 
support of Wula Nafaa in the following words: 
 Nature, Wealth and Power, what kind of relationship exists 
between these elements and in which context? Nature has a 
cultural element… My sensibility towards nature depends 
on where I come from. We are a developing country where 
the level of literacy is very low in rural areas. How does 
the peasant see nature? This nature does not belong to him. 
Nature is for everybody and for nobody. To change these 
attitudes, education is important. The peasant does not 
know documents that concern him. And even if he knows 
them, he does not know where to find them....
By emphasising the ‘cultural’ context of Senegal, and the 
‘cultural’ sensibilities and attitudes towards nature rooted in 
local identity, the Vice-President critiqued, in a subtle way, the 
project’s claims of representing the ‘local people’ and asserted 
the regional council’s own claims to represent the ‘local’. He 
provided his own version of how ‘the peasant’ thinks and acts. 
The peasant did not see nature as his private property, but 
as a common (for everybody) and inalienable (for nobody) 
property. This neo-Malthusian view of the ‘traditional’ tenure 
was unsuitable for the present needs and needed to be changed 
through education, he contended. The Vice-President did not 
oppose the idea of privatisation, but emphasised the necessity 
to change peasants’ ‘traditional’ attitudes towards property. 
For the regional council, Wula Nafaa was useful in providing 
peasants with education to change their attitudes towards 
property and, informing them about laws (documents).
The President of the Rural Councils’ Association on the other 
hand, supported Wula Nafaa for a different reason. He made 
the comment that was mentioned at the beginning of the article:
 The management of the environment is an authority 
(Fr. compétence) transferred to rural communities. 
However, what the State gives with its right hand, it 
takes back with its left hand. The management of natural 
resources generates financial resources. How will the state 
allow these resources to be devolved to local populations? 
Wula Nafaa program is a very good initiative for this.
The President agreed that commercial exploitation was 
an important means to generate financial revenues for rural 
communities. However, he was concerned that the revenue 
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generated was not going to trickle down to ‘local populations,’ 
particularly if the Forestry Department and PROGEDE 
continued to control the commercial exploitation of terroir 
forests. He used the metaphor of the right hand giving and the 
left hand taking it back, to criticise the ongoing practices of 
the Forestry Department and PROGEDE. The ‘state,’ through 
decentralisation laws, had given them the management of 
terroir forests. But in practice, Forestry Service and PROGEDE 
took these powers back. In this way, what was given was also 
taken back. If rural councils had to make a choice between 
PROGEDE and Wula Nafaa, the rural councils preferred the 
commercialisation and privatisation of forests under Wula 
Nafaa, which they hoped would benefit them more. 
CONCLUSION
The 1996 Senegalese decentralisation reforms brought forth 
the tension between maintaining the displaced state control 
over elected councils, and opening a space for business-
like contractual ‘agreements’ for the privatisation of terroir 
forests. I argued that these seemingly contradictory goals 
of decentralisation can, and do work in tandem. These 
reforms did not simply constrain the powers transferred to 
elected authorities in Senegal. They were also conducive 
to commodification of terroir forests and the privatisation 
of their governance. By introducing new mechanisms 
promoting contractual agreements among elected councils 
and donor-funded community-based projects, Senegalese 
regionalisation reforms provided an enabling environment for 
these changes.  Forest management plans are an example of 
such mechanisms. Drafted by community-based projects, these 
are not simply means to allow ‘local people’ to ‘secure’ forest 
rights (Mustalahti and Lund 2010). They are political tools 
restraining the authority of elected councils (Ribot 2003) and 
putting the expert knowledge claims in the service of market 
relations (Nightingale 2005). However, the case of Senegal 
shows that treated as ‘cooperation agreements,’ they can also 
serve as key instruments for furthering the privatisation of 
forests under community-based projects.
 This article also illustrated how ‘community-
based’ forestry is embedded within particular institutional 
contexts and power relations that were deeply transformed 
by decentralisation reforms.  The examples of Wula Nafaa 
and PROGEDE show that ‘community-based’ projects do 
not only promote the commercialisation of forests under the 
jurisdiction of rural councils, but also, play a central role 
in the privatisation of resource governance by establishing 
project-based committees that they treat as private commercial 
organisations. This constitutes also a model for current 
community-based carbon forestry projects that rely on payment 
for ecosystem services (Chomba this volume).  
 In Tambacounda community-based projects offered 
different models of privatisation of governance of terroir 
forests – one under the Forestry Department oversight and 
the other without it. This had important implications for the 
regional councils’ ability to act as ‘local representatives’. The 
role of ‘intermediaries of development’ assigned to regional 
councils facilitated their instrumentalisation as a means to 
diffuse the development demands from below and serve as 
‘hubs’ for private-public partnerships in natural resource 
management. The latter’s ability to respond to the needs and 
interests of the inhabitants of the region in the governance 
of forests, and to hold accountable the Forestry Department 
– thus, to act as ‘local representative’ – was compromised. 
Further, even though the regional councils were supposed to 
offer a democratic deliberative forum for rural councils, I have 
illustrated that the unequal power relations between the rural 
councils, Forestry Department, PROGEDE and Wula Nafaa 
had been re-enacted in Regional Council meeting. The regional 
council’s meeting was used to present different privatisation 
options as a democratic ‘choice,’ and to make representation 
claims about the ‘interests’ and ‘needs’ of ‘local people’ in 
line with neoliberal market rationality. This illustrates how 
the concept of ‘deliberative democracy,’ deployed often in 
support of decentralisation and community-based natural 
resource management, can also become part of ‘repertoires of 
domination’ (Poteete and Ribot 2010). Rather than opening up 
a genuine space for democratic debate, forums like the regional 
council can become theatres for performing a ‘choiceless’ 
democracy (Mkandawire cited in Ribot 2011, 2013).
NOTES
1. Before the establishment of Kedougou as a separate region 
in 2008, the Region of Tambacounda was the largest region 
in Senegal. In 2004, the Region of Tambacounda included 35 
rural communities (the most-local scale of local government) 
operating at the scale of 1463 villages.
2. The project’s name derives from its adopted Mandika motto: 
‘Wula Nafaa ani Famaya’ (Power and Benefit of the Forest).
3. After Independence, Senegalese territories were classified 
into four development zones: protected zones, urban zones, 
pioneer zones and terroir zones. The terroir zones, under the 
jurisdiction of rural community councils, were areas designated 
primarily for agricultural production. Before decentralisation, 
Forestry Department was the sole authority mandated with the 
management of forests in these areas. 
4. The Forestry Law of 1998 and its application decrees put 
considerable emphasis on commercial exploitation. This is 
illustrated by the fact that the majority of the articles and an 
entire Section (Titre II) of the Law were dedicated to this issue. 
5. There has been another reform of local government in Senegal 
since this research was conducted. The new decentralisation 
law (Law No. 2013-10 of 28 December 2013 on Local 
Government) has established Departments as new administrative 
units replacing the regions. The current article focuses on the 
period preceding the establishment of departments. This new 
reform, which increased the number of mid-level elected local 
governments, aim also at increasing the ‘competitiveness’ and 
efficiency of local authorities especially in the field of sustainable 
development; and thus, promises to have interesting implications 
for sub-national representation in Forestry in Senegal.
6. One of the limitations of this view is that elections can also 
produce representatives that are not accountable to their 
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electorate but to political party leadership and/or to ‘customary 
authorities’ (Agrawal & Ribot 1999; Beck 2001; Stokke & 
Selboe 2009). Thus, ‘free and fair’ elections are a necessary but 
not sufficient mechanism for accountability. 
7. During 1996, a total of 6 laws and 24 decrees were adopted. 
The main Local Government Codes consists of Laws 96-06 and 
96-07 of March 1996.
8. Unlike political decentralisation, de-concentration refers to the 
scaling down of powers within the administrative hierarchy 
rather than to elected councils of local governments.
9. Due to the importance given to the region, this last wave 
of decentralisation came also to be known as the reform of 
regionalisation.
10. Law 96-06 (Articles 15, 17, 71, 179, 239).
11. The cooperation agreements were akin to administrative 
contracts, as the central state administration or its de-
concentrated branches were necessary parties.
12. The parties involved (the central and de-concentrated state 
institutions and the elected councils) were expected to 
deliberate and decide on the contend, scope and purpose of this 
‘framework.’ 
13. In French the term compétence has multiple meanings. It can 
refer to jurisdiction/power and recognised ability and experience 
in a particular area. Therefore, its usage in legal texts allows the 
interpretation that technical capacity as constituting the basis of 
jurisdiction/power. I thank Jesse Ribot for drawing my attention 
to this.
14. Decentralisation laws put the condition of management plan 
approved by the ‘competent state’ authority as a condition for 
the rural councils to be able to commercially exploit terroir 
forests (Law 96-07, Art 7, 30 and Law 98-164, Art. R9, R11 
and R14).
15. Through charcoal exploitation quota, the Forestry Department 
can decide where, how much and by whom the production 
would take place. The elimination of national charcoal quota was 
central for the project’s outcome of liberalisation. However, as 
the Forestry Department was against such measure, the project 
argued that the elimination of quota was ‘neither necessary nor 
a positive result on its own.’ 
16. The project’s organisation reflected a business model based on 
sub-contracting different components to different private firms 
and companies.
17. After conducting ‘value-chain’ studies of 49 potential 
commodities, the project determined those that were most likely 
to be profitable on the market. 
18. The Groupement d’Intérêt Économique (Economic Interest 
Groups), regulated by the Commercial Codes, are formed on 
‘voluntary basis’ by at least two people that share a common 
commercial goal. 
19. A buffer zone of 1 km was established around the National Park 
when the Park became a World Heritage Site of UNESCO in 
1980.
20. According to the Forestry Code the rural councils have to pass 
a memorandum of understanding (protocole d’accord) with the 
Forestry Service to co-manage parts of the gazetted forests. 
21. The rural council of Dialakoto at the time had two councillors 
from the villages included into the management of the reserve.
22. Article 13 of Law 96-07.
23. Following the hierarchical ‘pyramid’ of planning, rural 
community-level plans are supposed to be in conformity with the 
regional plans, and the regional plans had to fit into the national 
level plans.
24. These roles were defined in Decree in 1998 (Decree 98-399).
25. Even though the rural and urban councils are required to 
contribute to the budget of ARDs, given the limited resources 
available to them, most of the funding for the budget comes 
from international donors.
26. In 2008, a new Decree (Decree 2008-517) removed this 
‘technical commission’ however, put the ARDs under the 
administrative oversight of the Governor. 
27. Article 28 of Law 96-07 (Local Government Code), Article 66 
of Law 98-164 (Forestry Code). 
28. The absenteeism of rural councils can also be related to the 
failure to be informed or invited (Ribot 2009).
29. Due to these tensions, a team of experts from the United States 
Forestry Department were dispatched to propose a methodology 
for management plans and to mediate between the project and 
the Forestry Department. 
30. These tensions would only be solved in 2007 when the project 
would be also put under the authority of the Forestry Service.
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